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ABSTRACT
For systems having computers as a significant component, it becomes a critical
task to identify the potential threats that the users of the system can present, while
being both inside and outside the system. One of the most important factors that
differentiate an insider from an outsider is the fact that the insider being a part of the
system, owns privileges that enable him/her access to the resources and processes of
the system through valid capabilities. An insider with malicious intent can potentially
be more damaging compared to outsiders. The above differences help to understand
the notion and scope of an insider.
The significant loss to organizations due to the failure to detect and mitigate the
insider threat has resulted in an increased interest in insider threat detection. The
well-studied effective techniques proposed for defending against attacks by outsiders
have not been proven successful against insider attacks. Although a number of se-
curity policies and models to deal with the insider threat have been developed, the
approach taken by most organizations is the use of audit logs after the attack has
taken place. Such approaches are inspired by academic research proposals to address
the problem by tracking activities of the insider in the system. Although tracking and
logging are important, it is argued that they are not sufficient. Thus, the necessity
to predict the potential damage of an insider is considered to help build a stronger
evaluation and mitigation strategy for the insider attack. In this thesis, the question
that seeks to be answered is the following: ‘Considering the relationships that exist
between the insiders and their role, their access to the resources and the resource set,
what is the potential damage that an insider can cause?’
A general system model is introduced that can capture general insider attacks
including those documented by Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) for
the Software Engineering Institute (SEI). Further, initial formulations of the damage
i
potential for leakage and availability in the model is introduced. The model usefulness
is shown by expressing 14 of actual attacks in the model and show how for each case
the attack could have been mitigated.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
There has been a significant rise in risks, threats, and several forms of attacks on
the organizations, where information plays a crucial role (PwC 2015). For systems
having computers as a significant component, it becomes a critical task to identify
the potential threats that the users of the system can present, while being both inside
and outside the system. Most of the initial works done in the field of security identify
themselves with the outsider threat, proposing models and techniques, such as attack
graphs (Phillips, Swiler et al. 1998; Sheyner, Haines, et al. 2002; Swiler, Phillips
et al. 2001) Intrusion Detection Systems (Porras and Neumann 1997; Stanifor-Chen,
Cheung et al. 1996), and Access Control Lists (Zhang, Li, et al. 2004). But a growing
reliance of organizations on information infrastructures and individuals who own the
capabilities for such infrastructures made the organization increasingly vulnerable to
threats from the insiders. This demanded a shift in research paradigm towards insider
threat.
One of the most important factors that differentiate an insider from an outsider
is the fact that the insider being a part of the system, owns privileges that enable
him/her access to the resources and processes of the system through valid capabilities
(Bishop and Gates 2008). Another aspect of this difference is the amount of knowledge
that an insider has about the organization’s system. Such knowledge can include not
just the information about resources, but also the location of the resources along with
the capabilities of other employees having access to these resources. This knowledge,
overall, exposes partial or full internal structure of the system to the insider.
Despite the fact that trusting insiders is paramount to the functionality of an
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organization, a full and blind trust could create a potential for misuse of their capa-
bilities. An insider with malicious intent can potentially be more damaging compared
to outsiders. The above differences help us understand the notion and scope of an
insider.
The implication of attack from the insiders is clearly manifested by the findings of
Moore et al. (2008), according to which the monetary losses, due to insider attacks,
ranged from five hundred dollars to tens of million dollars. Around 75 percent of
the organizations had a negative impact on their business operations and 28 percent
experienced a negative impact on their reputation as an affect of insider attack (Bara-
caldo and Joshi. 2013). The report by U.S State of Cybercrime Survey (PwC 2015),
sponsored by CERT insider threat center, found that 23 percent of electronic crime
events were suspected or known to be caused by an insider. In the 2017 survey, by
the same division of CERT (PwC 2017), nearly 30 percent of all respondents reported
that incidents caused by insider attacks were more costly or damaging than outsider
attacks. Among the attacks where insiders were the source, 35 percent of incidents
had private or sensitive information intentionally exposed by them.
The significant loss to organizations due to the failure to detect and mitigate the
insider threat has resulted in an increased interest in insider threat detection. The
well-studied effective techniques proposed for defending against attacks by outsiders
have not been proven successful against insider attacks (Colwill and Carl 2009). Al-
though this has led to the development of different security policies and models which
directly deal with the insider threat, the approach taken by most organizations is the
use of audit logs such as the one suggested by Anderson and Brackney (2004), af-
ter the attack has taken place. Such approaches are inspired by academic research
proposals to attack the problem by tracking activities of the insider in the system.
Although tracking and logging are important, we argue that they are not sufficient.
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With the in-depth knowledge of the system, malicious insiders tend to create an at-
tack path which can remain invisible to such tracking methods. Thus, we consider
that a method of predicting the potential damage based on the knowledge of the in-
sider which the insider accumulates from his/her access to the resources in the system
can help build a stronger evaluation and mitigation strategy for the insider attack.
In this thesis, the question we seek to answer is, ‘Considering the relationships
that exist between the insiders and their role, their access to the resources and the
resource set, what is the potential damage that an insider can cause based on future
events from use of such accesses?’
1.1 Approach
Security agencies and organizations such as CERT have successfully documented
several instances of insider attacks in the form of use cases and determined the pat-
terns and trends of malicious activities (Silowash, George et al. 2012). Detailed
classifications of incidents have been provided based on where the threats can be
detected within the target system. We start by utilizing these use cases and classifi-
cations to formulate an exhaustive model in which various scenarios discussed in the
use cases can be expressed.
Such a model is not straightforward. In fact, our study of the CERT cases shows
that the insiders can cause damage either by remaining within their default set of
privileges or exceeding it by seeking new capabilities. In the latter case, the exposed
value to the insider could increase with the augmentation of new capabilities. We want
our model to represent access to and propagation of the information. For example, “it
is one thing to control access to a file and another to control access to all information
in the system derived from or dependent upon the data in the file” (Cohen, Ellis,
et al. 1975). Thus, with an established model, we take into consideration, various
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aspects of data leakage and availability compromise through capability augmentation
and see how it can contribute to the calculation of the final exposed value.
1.2 Contributions
The contributions in this thesis are structured around the central questions of how
to calculate the damage potential of an insider working for an organization having
access to the computer system. Our model is motivated by Hydra, an object-based
computer system with capability developed for the creation of a highly secured system
and by the elements of graph theory. The unique contributions of this thesis are listed
below.
• Differing from the previous systems that suggest the use of attack paths (Chin-
chani, Iyer. et al. 2005) and those which uses the risk values derived from the
trust factors (Baracaldo and Joshi. 2013), to calculate the risk of occurrence of
threats , we try to focus on how a legitimate user can access the system around
him and use his capabilities to affect the state of the system. In this work,
we analyze the nature of information in the computer system and the insider’s
capabilities to move the information within or outside the system.
• As our next contribution, we model the capability of the insider to affect the
availability of the system. To our current knowledge, no models which tried
to predict the threat of the insider considered the availability aspect of the
system. Our study of CERT insider attack cases reveals that among the 50
cases analyzed, 20 had the insider affecting or trying to affect the availability
of the system.
• Another important contribution of this work is the creation of a corpus of se-
lected cases, where we analyze each type of data that has been accessed, the
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access rights that were available to the insider, and the channels used for the
attack. Further, we provide the representation of the cases using our model
which would help us understand the ways that malicious insiders use to launch
the attack in the system. We also provide mitigation strategies based on threat
actions that explain how our model could be used to prevent similar attacks.
1.3 Organization
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Related work is discussed in
Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, we describe our proposed model and define various com-
ponents that build a computer system. Information Flow and the damage potential
associated with it are given in Chapter 4. The Availability Damage is described
in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6, we apply our model to several use cases. Chapter 7
concludes the thesis.
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Chapter 2
RELATED WORK
The research community has focused on various modes of insider threat detection and
prevention such as attack paths, attack strategies, intrusion model, access control and
risk-assessment processes. But the analysis and calculation of damage potential of
an employee within the organization have not yet received the appropriate research
focus. Silowash suggest that the organizations must identify those high-risk users
who most often interact with the critical systems or data (Silowash, George, et al.
2012). Such an identification is a complex task and requires an elaborate study of the
system and its user’s capabilities. Various approaches have been suggested in order
to identify such users and resources in order to mitigate insider threat.
One of the few recent works on the estimation of threat by an insider belongs
to Chinchani et al. The authors used a threat model called key challenge graph
which focuses on the legitimate user’s view of an organization network (Chinchani
et al. 2005). It relies on the representation of capabilities present as any vertex as
a key and the presence of a security measure or policy that protects the resources
as a key challenge on the channel of communication. It then identifies the scope of
threat by defining the cost of an attack that the insider can perform. Although we
follow a similar graph representation for our model, in our approach, we focus on
the damage that an insider can cause as opposed to the cost of individual attacks
as proposed by them. A Key Challenge Graph has also been used by Ha et al who
introduced an information-centric and graph-oriented tool which takes the physical
network topology and a predefined set of vulnerabilities as external inputs, combined
with the network translational tools and cost analysis for constructing a key-challenge
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graph (Ha, Upadhyaya, et al. 2007). Unlike our work, which looks at the graph from
the perspective of the user’s capabilities, they used the graph to know the likely attack
strategies, vulnerable points, and critical points of the attackers based on the cost of
attacks.
In the context of our work, other relevant proposed methods are those based on
the use of attack graphs and privilege graphs. The attack graph is usually used to
determine whether attackers starting from a specific location can gain normally re-
stricted privilege levels on one or more important targets (Lippmann and Ingols 2005;
Ammann 2002). Starting from a source, (Artz 2002) proposes to find all paths to all
possible goals and perform reachability computation. It then determines the visibility
of attack paths to the intrusion detection system. Taking this approach a step further,
(Gorodetski 2016) uses formal grammar to specify allowable paths and then generate
individual random paths from the grammar. With the final goal of preventing the
attacker from reaching the goal state, (Jajodia, Noel, et al. 2003) reads vulnerability
and reachability information, computes attack graphs using the approach described in
(Ammann 2002) and makes the recommendations to prevent access to critical hosts.
A weakness of these approaches is the assumption that reachability information is
available prior to computing attack graphs. Determining such information can be
computationally complex task (Lippmann and Ingols 2005). Differing from the at-
tack graphs, our approach does not limit itself to exposure of paths and reachability
problem but goes beyond to calculate the damage associated with each found path.
A related technical approach taken by some researchers is of risk assessment based
on the potential risks of illegal access via role misuse or abuse. (Baracaldo and Joshi
2013) presented a framework that extended the role-based access control (RBAC)
model by incorporating a risk assessment process and the trust system has in its
users. It explains trust as dependent on the context in which the interaction between
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entities takes place and explains risk by the likelihood of a hazardous situation and its
consequence if it occurs. It then calculates the risk using the expected value formula
(Celikel et al. 2009), where the probability of occurrence is multiplied by the cost
of the event. (Salim et al. 2011) uses the costs of access assigned to permissions
depending on the risk of their operations with each user being assigned a budget.
The activation of a role by a user depends not just upon the assigned roles to him but
also on the cost of activating the role which is bounded by the budget. In another
effort, (Chen et al. 2001) proposed a model which uses the trustworthiness of a user
to calculate the risk associated with a role, and the degree of appropriateness of the
permission-role assignments. None of these techniques takes into account how the
information accessed by a role can be used malevolently against the interest of the
organization, which is the prime focus of our model.
Behavioral theories have also been used for the development of preventive models
for insider threats. (Schultz 2002) described a theoretical prediction model based
on five behavioral indicators, “deliberate markers, meaningful errors, preparatory
behavior, correlated usage patterns and verbal behavior”, which could be counted
together to predict and detect insider threats. Similarly [Wood 2000] identifies various
aspects of users who pose insider threat and claims that users are assumed to have
the skills needed to attack the system and to be risk-averse. Some works also present
a comprehensive view of psychological approaches to detecting the insider threat.
(Greitzer and Frincke 2010) described this approach by identifying factors such as
disgruntlement, anger management, disengagement, performance and absenteeism
as predictors of insider threat together with the use of Bayesian-Net led predictive
model. On the same note, several different theories on the behavior of insiders are
presented by (Theoharidou, Marianthi, et al. 2005), among which situational crime
prevention theory suggests that cyber crimes occur when a person has both motive and
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opportunity- so by either removing motive or denying a malicious user an opportunity,
we can help prevent the crime. These approaches are limited because of their methods
of predicting the threat revolves around only the behavioral aspect of the threat. We
choose to take an approach of not predicting the attack but evaluating the potential
attacks, if they ever happen.
Potential leaks and compromises have been calculated using various activity and
risk analysis models that are built around the database activities. (Celikel 2009)
proposed a probabilistic risk management model for enhanced access control in dis-
tributed databases. They incorporated failure modes and effective analysis (FMEA)
for measuring user risks in their design. (Harel, Amir, et al. 2012) presented a new
concept, Misuseability Weight, for estimating the risk emanating from data exposed
to insiders. It assigns a score that represents the sensitivity level of the data exposed
to the user and by that predicts the ability of the user to maliciously exploit this
data.
As previously stated, none of the above-proposed methods comprehensively con-
sider the capabilities to transfer the data as well as affect the availability of the system
together to estimate the potential damage to an organization by any given user.
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Chapter 3
MODEL
The proposed model is designed to calculate the damage potential of an insider by
considering the insider’s access to the various resources in the computer system. In
our model, we assume that the insider has some authorization in terms of access rights
and can use these rights to perform actions that affect the system. Furthermore, we
assume that the insider and the potential target are not necessarily at the same
location and thus one or more intermediate channels of interaction are needed to
establish communication between the insider and the target. Since the system has a
finite set of tasks that can be performed, we assume that any action performed in the
system is a combination of such predefined tasks. We consider that the insider has
an initial authentication to use the system.
3.1 Definitions
Prior to the formal definition of the system model and the actions that could be
performed within the system, we describe the various components.
Definition 3.1 The object set O is a set of all physical and logical resources
available to be accessed by a process in the system. For example, disks, files, source
codes can be represented as objects. An object has the following components: Type,
Nature, Data and Capability List (Figure 1).
1. Type determines what operation can be performed on the object. It could be of
either Procedure or Text.
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Figure 3.1: Computer System’s Object
2. Nature represents the nature of the resource that the object represents and is
assumed to be related to the value of the object in the real world. For instance,
some objects require that their integrities be well guarded, other objects are
sensitive (their leakage would result in a lot of damage to the organization),
while others may be critical and sensitive simultaneously.
3. Data part represents the information stored in the object
4. Capability List (C-list) represents the capability that an object of type procedure
has. This field is empty for the objects that are not of type procedure.
Definition 3.1.1 The Procedure set Pr is a set of objects of type procedure which
can be executed to create new processes. Each procedure has a C-list associated with
it. We assume that the set of objects in the system is finite.
Definition 3.2 The Process set P is a set of processes executing in the system.
This set is not fixed. Processes can be created and killed. A process can create
another process by executing a procedure and can pass capabilities to the newly
created process. The newly created process inherits the capabilities already present
in the procedure along with the capabilities passed to it by the process creating it.
In order for a process to execute a procedure, it should own exec capability for the
procedure.
Definition 3.3 The vertex set V is a finite set of physical nodes where processes
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Figure 3.2: Computer System’s Capability
and objects can reside.
Definition 3.4 The channel set represents the set of channels in the system. Each
channel is defined by two vertices, possibly the same. Objects can be transferred
across channels and processes can be executed or created across channels.
channel ⊆ V × V
Definition 3.5 The capability set C is a set of tokens which gives the process a
permission to perform an action on an object or a process in the computer system.
It is represented as a tuple containing a unique entity and the access right (figure 2),
where the entity can be either an object or a process. The access right defines the
operation that can be performed on the entity and can be, but is not limited to, read,
write, execute, or kill. For example, (antivirus , kill) is a capability describing that a
process which owns it can kill the antivirus process.
Definition 3.6 (Capability of a process)
Cap : P → P(O × A) is a function which determines the set of capabilities
possessed by a process p ∈ P . For example, Cap(p) = [(o, read), (o′, copy)] means
that process p has two capabilities: read of o and copy of o′.
Definition 3.7 (Resource at a vertex)
Res : V → P(O ∪ P ) is the resource mapping from a node to the set of objects
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and processes that it contains. Thus, the set of processes and objects that can also
be expressed as:
P =
⋃
v∈V
Res(v) \O
O =
⋃
v∈V
Res(v) \ P
Definition 3.8 (Location of a resource)
Loc : P ∪ O → V is the location mapping from processes or objects to their
respective location, i.e. the vertex at which they reside.
Definition 3.9 (Value of a resource)
val : P ∪ O → R≥0 is a mapping from entities to their value in the system. The
value of all entities is positive.
Definition 3.10 (Adjacent Vertices)
Adj : V → P(V ) is a function which maps a given node v to a set of adjacent
nodes. Adjacent nodes are the nodes which are directly reachable from the given
node.
Definition 3.11 (System State) Given a system with set of vertices and adja-
cency relation on these vertices, the system state specifies the state of each vertex in
the system and the capabilities of all processes in the system. The state of a vertex
includes the resources that reside at the vertex. Formally, specifying the system state
consists of two mappings that specifies where objects and processes are and what
capabilities they have.
• Resources: specifies for each vertex the resources at the vertex. Res : V 7→
P(O ∪ P ).
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Figure 3.3: Computer System Overview
• Capabilities specifies for each process in the system the capability of the process:
Cap : P 7→ P(O × A).
The state of the system is then defined as a
state = 〈Res × Cap〉
. Let State be the set of all possible states in the system.
3.2 Creation of Process at a Node
In the system with set of vertices V , set of processes P , and a set of capabilities
C, a process p ∈ P running at node v can create a process p′ at v′ which could be
the same node as v or a node adjacent to v, by executing the procedure o which
transitions the system to a state where p′ gets added to the existing set of resources
at v′. Formally, the action createProcess(〈Res,Cap〉, v, v′, p, c) is enabled if
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• o ∈ Pr,
• Cap(p) 3 (execute, o),
• v = Loc(p),
• v′ = Loc(o), and
• v′ ∈ adj(v) ∨ v′ = v, then
After executing the action, we have the new system state 〈Res′, Cap′〉 whereRes′(v′) =
Res(v′) ∪ p′ and C = C ∪Cap(p′) and Loc(p′) = v′ and Res′(x) = Res(x) for x 6= v′.
3.3 Access of Objects
A process can delete an object residing at the same node and it can read and
write objects residing at the same node or at an adjacent node if the process has the
required capability for the action.
Deletion of an object In the system with set of vertices V , set of processes P ,
and a set of capabilities C, the action a =′ delete′ can be performed on an object
{o} ∈ O at node v by process p running on the same node v. It transitions the system
in which all resources are unchanged except at node v for which the object is deleted
from the set of resources. The deletion of an object is enabled if:
• v = Loc(p)
• v = Loc(o)
• Cap(p) 3 (delete, o)
A function delete : State × V ertices × Processes × Capabilities −→ State is
defined by
delete(〈Res, Cap〉, v, p, c) = 〈Res′, Cap〉
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where Res′(v) = Res(v)− o, Res′(x) = Res(x) for x 6= v.
The effect of a process accessing an object for reading or writing is not explicitly
modeled in the system state. Such action transfer data between processes and objects
and we reason about their effect when we model the damage potential by considering
possible executions in the system.
Reading of object In a system with set of vertices V , a set of processes P , and
a set of capabilities defined by Cap, the read action can be performed on an object
{o} ∈ O at node v′ by process p running on node v, where v and v′ are the same node
or are adjacent nodes. The read action is enabled if
• v = Loc(p)
• v′ = Loc(o)
• v′ ∈ adj(v) or v′ = v
• Cap(p) = (read, o)
Writing of object In a system with set of vertices V , a set of processes P , and
a set of capabilities defined by Cap, the write action can be performed on an object
{o} ∈ O at node v′ by process p running on node v, where v and v′ are the same node
or are adjacent nodes. The write action is enabled if
• v = Loc(p)
• v′ = Loc(o)
• v′ ∈ adj(v) or v′ = v
• Cap(p) = (write, o)
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3.4 Killing of Process at a Node
A process can kill another process at the same or an adjacent node if it has the
required capability. The kill action is enabled if:
• v = Loc(p)
• v′ = Loc(p′)
• v′ ∈ adj(v) or v′ = v
• Cap(p) 3 (p′, kill)
A function killProcess : State × V ertices × V ertices × Process × Process ×
Capabilities −→ State is defined by:
killProcess(〈Res ,Cap〉, v, v′, p, p′, c) = 〈Res ′,Cap〉
where Res ′(v′) = Res(v′)−p′ and C ′ = C\Cap(p′) In the system with set of vertices V ,
set of processes P , and a set of capabilities C, a process p ∈ P running at node v can
kill a process p′ at v′ which can be same as node v or adjacent to v, which transitions
the system to a state where p′ is removed from the existing set of resources at v′.
3.5 Illustration
An Example showing deletion of an object Consider a set of operations by
a process aimed at deleting an object located at an adjacent node. Let 〈Res ,Cap〉 be
the initial state of the system (assuming V and the adjacency information is given).
The steps that would be required for satisfying the request would be of the form:
〈Res ,Cap〉 ====================⇒
createProcess(v, v’, p, (execute, o))
〈Res ′,Cap〉 (3.1)
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where Res′(v′) = Res(v′) ∪ p′ and C ′ = C ∪ Cap(p′)
=============⇒
delete(v, p, (delete, o))
〈Res ′′,Cap〉 (3.2)
where Res′′(v) = Res′(v)− o
================⇒
killProcess(v, v’, p, (kill, p’))
〈Res ′′′,Cap ′〉 (3.3)
where Res′′′(v′) = Res′(v′)− p′ and Cap ′ = Cap − Cap(p′)
3.6 Effective Damage Potential
To calculate the effective damage potential of a process, we need to consider
damages that could be incurred by both the transfer of data as well as by the affect
on the availability of the system. This damage depends on the capabilities initially
possessed by a process along with the capabilities gained with the creation of new
processes by it. Thus the effective capability of a process is defined as
EffectiveCapability(P ) = Cap(P )
⋃
P ′ created byP
EffectiveCapability(P ′)
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Chapter 4
INFORMATION FLOW IN THE COMPUTER SYSTEM
An information flow policy within a computer system specifies a set of nodes and a
flow relation defining permissible flows among these nodes.
In order to characterize the admissible transfer rate for the information flow from
a single node, let us revisit our definition of computer system network. The computer
system is represented by a directed graph G(V,E), where information can be sent
noiselessly from v to v′ through (v, v′) ∈ E, where E represents the set of channels.
Definition 4.1 (Capacity of a channel) The capacity of a channel is the max-
imum permitted rate of object access (in bit per unit time) between two nodes.
HV×V : V × V → R≥0
A local access within the same node is a special case of object access by the process
running on the node. This makes the access relation among the nodes a partial order
relation.
Definition 4.2 (Flow) Flow fx,y is defined as the rate of transfer of information
(per unit time) stored in x to y, where x and y could be an object or a process. An
access specifies a flow in one of the following ways
• From an object to a process o −→ p
• From an object to an object o −→ o′
• From a process to an object p −→ o
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Figure 4.1: Information Flow
• From an object to a process recursively through objects o ∗−→ o′ −→ p
• From an object to a process recursively through processes o ∗−→ p −→ p′
A flow is admissible only if the process initiating the flow has the required capa-
bility for the transfer of information, and if the sum of all such flow is bounded by
the capacity of channel between the vertices on which the source and the destination
reside.
∑
x,y∈(O∪P )×P
fx,y ≤ Hv,v′ where Loc(x) = v, Loc(y) = v′
Definition 4.3 (Value of a Flow) valF : F → R≥0 is a mapping from flow to
their value in the system. It is the value of all the data transferred in the flow. The
value of all flows are positive.
4.1 Max-Flow and All-Path Algorithms
4.1.1 Max Flow
To calculate the maximum rate at which information can be transferred from a
source node to a target node, we use the Push-Relabel algorithm (Algorithm 1), which
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is considered one of the most efficient maximum flow algorithm. Throughout its exe-
cution, the algorithm maintains a ”preflow” and gradually converts it into a maximum
flow by moving flow locally between neighboring nodes using push operations under
the guidance of an admissible network maintained by ’relabel’ operations.
For example, let the capacities of the channels for the graph shown in figure 5 be as
following: H(s, a) = 2, H(s, b) = 2, H(a, b) = 2, H(a, t) = 2, H(b, t) = 1, H(s, t) = 0.
In this case, we can calculate the value of max flow from s to t is 3.
Let maxF be the maximum flow obtained from the algorithm. Thus, the total
value of information that could be transferred from the source vertex to a target
vertex is given by:
val(maxF )
4.1.2 All paths between the source and target
For a critical resource, we need to find all the paths to it to monitor the flow
through them. This is accomplished by the recursive algorithm below which finds all
the available paths between two nodes s and t in the system. The function canAccess :
V ×V → [True, False] determines if any process p at a node v can transfer the objects
to node v’ based on its available capabilities to create a process and access objects at
the adjacent node.
Consider the example in Figure 4 which illustrates the available channel between
the source and target nodes. If we suppose that node s has capability to access node
a, node a has capability to access the node b and t and node b has a capability to
access t, then using the above algorithm, the available paths between s and t would
be [s, a, t] and [s, a, b, t].
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Algorithm 1 To find maximum rate at which objects can be accessed at the desti-
nation node
s← source vertex
t← target vertex
V ← list of vertices
E ← list of Edges
G← Input Graph
G′ ← Residual Graph
procedure Initialize Preflow(n)
Initialize height and flow of every vertex as 0
Set original labelling d(s) = n, d(v) = 0,∀v ∈ V, v 6= s
Send c(s− v) flow on each edge s− v ∈ Eand v ∈ V
For each node v with s− v ∈ E, v − s ∈ G′ and excess e(v) = c(s− v)
procedure Push(u)
if ∃v with admissible edge u-v∈ Ef then
Send δ
.
= min(c(u− v), e(u)) from u to v
e(u)← e(u)− δ
e(v)← e(v) + δ
procedure Relabel(u)
for each u-v from u do
if u− v /∈ Eford(v) ≥ d(u) then
d(u) = 1 +min(v:uv)∈Efd(v)
procedure Main Loop()
while ( do Push() or Relabel() returns true )
Push() or Relabel()
return flow
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Algorithm 2 Brute force algorithm to find all the paths with permitted flow of
information between two given nodes
s← source vertex
t← target vertex
P ← list of vertices
Path← list of P
procedure FindAllPaths(v),
P.append(v)
for each vertex v’ in adj(v) do
if canAccess(v, v′) = true then
if v′ = t then
Path← Path ∪ P
else if adj(v′) = NULL then
return
else if v′ /∈ P then
FindAllPath(v′)
P ← P − P [length of P]
return
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Chapter 5
AVAILABILITY IN THE COMPUTER SYSTEM
To formally define availability, we need to introduce the concept of service.
Definition 5.1 (Service) Service s = Ps ∪Os is a set of processes and objects.
The processes and objects of a service are those processes and objects necessary
for providing the functionality that the service implements. A variety of services can
be provided by a computer system. For example, rendering of a patient portal page
with the patient’s information can be a service provided by a health-care organization.
Every service requires a set of processes and objects which can be made available to
the client of the service.
For a given service s = Ps ∪ Os, each object or process in Ps ∪ Os might be
available (operational) or not available, but the availability of the service does not
necessarily require the availability of all resources of the service. It is possible that
some resources are interchangeable. Also, it is not always the case that the availability
of a service requires full connectivity among all its entities. For example, Figure
4 shows an application’s back-end system. Each server processes have their own
database objects along with the shared database object. Both the processes provide
simultaneous services to the web request, and the services are said to be available
if either of the process and local objects pair is available and the shared object is
available. Such conditions are expressed by an assertion, which is a predicate that
capture the requirements on the availability of individual and groups of resources for
the system to be considered available.
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Figure 5.1: Example of a Service
As an example the following assertion for the service in Figure 5.1
(P1 ∧O1 ∧O3) ∨ (P2 ∧O2 ∧O3) (5.1)
states that if P1, O1 and O3 are available, the system is available. Also if P2, O2 and
O3 are available, the system is available.
Definition 5.2 (Availability of a Resource) avail : Ps ∪Os → {True, False}
is the availability function whose value determines if the process or object in the
system is available to be accessed by the client through the services.
Definition 5.3 (Minimum Resources for Availability ) minAvailable : S →
P(Ps ∪ Os) is the set of all such set of processes and objects whose combination
satisfies the assertion for the service’s availability. For the example in Figure 4,
{(p1, o1, o3), (p2, o2, o3)} would be the minAvailable set, with each of its elements
satisfying the assertion at (5.1). We can call the service available, if all the entities
are available for at least one element of this set.
Thus, the set of process and objects required by a service can be formally written
as:
Os = (
⋃
e∈minAvailable(s)
e) ∩O
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Ps = (
⋃
e∈minAvailable(s)
e) ∩ P
We further define the service to exhibit one of the following types of availability:
• Full Availability A service s ∈ S in the system is said to be fully available if
avail(o) = True, ∀o ∈ Os ∧ avail(p) = True, ∀p ∈ Ps
A fully available service has all its entities available for the clients.
Hence, the set of entities that contributes to the availability of the partial avail-
able system are the ones belonging to the subsets in the minAvailable that
satisfies the availability assertion and is represented as:
Entitiesf =
⋃
∀e∈Ps∪Os:avail(e)=True
e
• Partial Availability A service s ∈ S in the system with entities e ∈ P ∪O is
said to be partially available if
∃M ∈ minAvailable(s), ∀e ∈M : avail(e) = True
A partially available service has some of its entities unavailable for the clients
such that it still provides a part of the service or the full service at a lower rate.
Hence, the set of entities that contributes to the availability of the partial avail-
able system are the ones belonging to the subsets in the minAvailable that
satisfies the availability assertion and is represented as:
Entitiesp =
⋃
∃M∈minAvailable(s),∀e∈M :avail(e)=True
M
• Unavailability A service s ∈ S in the system with entities e ∈ P ∪O is termed
to be unavailable if
∀M ∈ minAvailable(s),∃e ∈M : avail(e) = False
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An unavailable service has all or some of its entities unavailable for the clients
which result in no service being provided to the clients and is represented as Su.
5.1 Calculating Value of Availability
A fully available service can be transformed into partially available service by
deleting some entities required by the service, for example by killing a running process
or by deleting objects with some value to the service.
Thus the value of Availability for a service in a system can be given in terms of
fully available service and partially available service as
A =
∑
e∈Entitiesp
val(e)∑
e∈Entitiesf
val(e)
where Entitiesp and Entitiesf are the entities that contributes to the availability of
partial and fully available systems respectively.
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Chapter 6
MAPPING MODEL TO THE USE CASES
This section demonstrates the application of our model using various cases which are
the part of the corpus created by Silowash, George, et al. (2012) for CERT, which
archive incidents related to the insider attacks. The model representation for each
case relates the subjects and actions of the case to the components of our model, and
how the threat manifests in the form of the threat value.
The mitigation strategies for each case offer a set of possible countermeasures that
could have been used to prevent the relevant attack. The suggested countermeasures
provide a more technical approach as compared to the countermeasures provided in
(Silowash, George, et al. 2012) which organizes the cases into different groups based
on the best practices to better aid the organization with the design of an insider
threat program. Although these provided solutions aides well for the policy-making,
most of the practices remain irrelevant to the technical aspects of the system.
6.1 Case 1
6.1.1 Summary
Figure 6.1 represents a research chemist working on a research project of an orga-
nization involving electronic technologies. He used his computer system to copy data
from the organization’s server to a laptop located at competitive organization. In
four months period, the insider downloaded 15,000 PDF files and more than 20,000
abstracts containing trade secrets of the victim organization. The leakage of data
outside the system took place using a removable device as a physical medium of
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Figure 6.1: Model Representation of Case 1
transfer.
6.1.2 Model Representation
Using our model representation, we can view the transitions in the system. The
sequence of transition steps are:
1. Insider created a process P2 at V2 using channel E1 from his computer V1, .
2. He accessed the objects at server V2 through P2.
3. With the use of ‘read’ and ‘write’ capability on objects, insider copied the
objects from V2 to V1 through the bidirectional channel E1.
4. He then used P1 to transfer objects o1...on to a removable device through E2.
5. Finally, he physically moved the removable device containing the objects outside
the organization. This physical movement is represented by channel E3.
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6.1.3 Mitigation Strategy
1. Threat Action - Large amount of data (around 300 documents) downloaded
every day for a period of four months and copied to a laptop at a different or-
ganization.
Countermeasure - Network level access control should define a limit on the
rate of data transfer for roles. A threshold should be defined to cap the maxi-
mum amount of data passing through a network point over a definite period of
time.
2. Threat Action - Accessed data not related to the research project.
Countermeasure - Consistent deployment of granular access control employ-
ing the principle of least privilege (insiders should have access only to the crit-
ical system functions and permissions necessary for carrying out their tasks) in
the form of capabilities. Creation of regularly monitored audit log objects to
capture access provided to high-risk users. Such an audit log would require a
strategic balance between what kind of events can be logged without affecting
the privacy of the insiders.
6.2 Case 2
6.2.1 Summary
Figure 6.2 represents a key member of IT support staff for a local bank who used
his privileged physical access to the area running live system to insert a malicious xls
file to bank’s batch file transfer system when most of the bank’s staff was off-duty.
The malicious file executed an unauthorized transfer in favor of the insider. An xls
spreadsheet was used to credit salary to the employees accounts through the bank’s
corporate account. The genuine salary transfer process was replicated in the malicious
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Figure 6.2: Model Representation of Case 2
file which had an additional list of charges, and this small amount was debited from
the bank’s corporate account and credited to his account each month.
6.2.2 Model Representation
The sequence of actions can be described with the model as:
1. Physical access for the insider to the area V1 running the live systems to support
the banking application system through high privileged capabilities.
2. He created procedure o2 representing malicious .xls file to be executed along the
normal .xls file which takes care of the salary transfer process.
3. Use of the edge E2 by him to connect to the server V2 containing the corporate
accounts.
4. Creation of process P2 at V2 through P1 by execution of procedure o2 to transfer
small amount from the bank’s corporate account to insider’s account.
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6.2.3 Mitigation Strategy
1. Threat Action - Accessed live system (meant to support banking application
system) when most of the bank’s staff were off-duty
Countermeasure - Access to vertices containing critical processes should re-
quire a combination of more than one capability (Separation of Duty) and the
capabilities should enforce time-based access control. Separation of Duty is
limited to organizations which can have more than one employee for similar
roles.
2. Threat Action - Created a new process inside a running critical system
Countermeasure - Creation of new process in a running system should not
be allowed or some regularly monitored audit log objects should be created to
capture the creation of a process that can access critical resources.
6.3 Case 3
6.3.1 Summary
Figure 6.3 represents a bookkeeper as an insider. She wrote around 70 checks,
which were available for her access, to pay for herself in two years. She altered
computer accounting records through her computer to show a different payee using
the highly effective write capability to manipulate objects of nature that were critical
to the organization’s finance. $200,000 was embezzled from the organization.
6.3.2 Model Representation
The sequence of actions can be described with the model as:
1. Insider used physical access to the area V1 containing physical checks and her
computer.
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Figure 6.3: Model Representation of Case 3
2. She created the process P1 to connect to the system containing the accounting
records.
3. She used the edge E1 to create process P2 at V2 and altering account objects o1
to on using write capability.
4. Further, she used the edge E2 to physically modify the checks.
5. She physically moved the check objects outside of the organization using edge
E3 to pay for herself.
6.3.3 Mitigation Strategy
1. Threat Action - Wrote large amount of checks worth $200,000
Countermeasure -
• Use of principle of Separation of Duty (splitting actions into separate duties
and having multiple persons do each action in order to complete the task)
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to perform actions such as finance operations that directly impact the
organization. Two processes having the capabilities for the action should
work together to perform it.
• A rate limit should be placed on the edge linking to the critical resource,
e.g. the edge to checkbook in this case.
2. Threat Action - Altered Organization’s records to show a different payee
Countermeasure - Logical objects that represent a physical object of high
value in the real world should have stronger access control. Creation of regularly
monitored audit log objects to capture accesses through high-risk processes.
6.4 Case 4
6.4.1 Summary
Figure 6.4 represents the scenario where a Unix Engineer working as a contractor
for a mortgage company was allowed to finish out the workday after being notified
for the contract termination. He planted a logic bomb in a trusted script while being
on-site. The script was designed to disable log-ins, delete root passwords and erase
all data, including backup data, on those servers. The script was designed to remain
dormant for 3 months but was detected before it could be executed.
6.4.2 Model Representation
The possible sequence of actions can be described with the model as:
1. Insider’s access to his computer in the organization V1 and creation of process
P1.
2. Further, he created a new process P21 to create a new procedure object (script)
o1 on V2 which can be executed later.
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Figure 6.4: Model Representation of Case 4
3. Activation of the procedure o1 would have created a process P22 which would
further create processes on other nodes, using the create capability for the new
processes.
4. P22 would have created edge E31 to create process P31 at V31. P31 could delete
all root passwords and hence disable log-in.
5. Similarly, P22 would have created edge E32 to create process P32 at V32. P32
could delete back up data objects on the server.
6. Further P3 would have created other process at different nodes to delete data,
including backup data.
6.4.3 Mitigation Strategy
1. Threat Action - Planted logic bomb in a trusted script
Countermeasure - Use of the principle of Separation of Duty for code devel-
opment and review. The capabilities to edit the objects containing critical codes
should be restricted to nodes meant for development and should be reviewed
35
Figure 6.5: Model Representation of Case 5
before reaching the production environment.
2. Threat Action - Script designed to disable log in and monitoring
Countermeasure - Putting critical processes such as logging and monitoring
out of the application’s purview. The edges between the nodes running scripts
and the one controlling monitoring should have stronger access control.
6.5 Case 5
6.5.1 Summary
Figure 6.5 represents a scenario where a system administrator was responsible for
critical system servers. Having root access to one server, he created a file that enabled
him access to the second server. The insider then inserted a malicious code inside
the second server that had capabilities to delete all organization’s file when a certain
volume is reached
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6.5.2 Model Representation
The sequence of actions can be described with the model as:
1. Insider’s access to his computer V1 and creation of process P1.
2. Insider then accessed first server at V2 using E1 over local area network which
was created by root password as a capability.
3. He then created procedure object o2 at V2 with capability for creating process
at V3.
4. Further, he created process P31 at second server located at V3 by creating an
edge E3 over local area network.
5. Once at V3, he edited an object o3 by inserting the malicious code using the
‘write’ capability.
6. He planned to use procedure o3 with malicious code owning capability to create
a new process P32 at V3 which has delete capabilities for objects at V3
7. P32 would have deleted objects o31 to o3n using the delete capability.
6.5.3 Mitigation Strategy
1. Threat Action - Use of privilege account to create an object enabling access
to a different server
Countermeasure - Pulling entitlement decision (creation of capabilities) out
of the application. Enabling Separation of Duty by moving policy-making de-
cisions to a central node.
2. Threat Action - Inserted malicious code that would delete all the organiza-
tion’s files.
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Countermeasure - Since the procedure would have found an access path (a
sequence of one or more access points that lead to a critical system) to all the
data in the organization, discovering all paths to the critical system can prevent
such attacks. Access paths can be discovered by locating all the processes and
the edges they can create based on the capabilities available. Regular moni-
toring for finding such access paths can reduce the number of unknown access
paths available to the insiders.
3. Threat Action - The code could have disabled system logging, removed history
files and removed traces of malicious code
Countermeasure - Putting critical processes such as logging and monitoring
out of the application’s purview. Deletion capabilities should come under Sepa-
ration of Duty access control with a threshold value on how much and how fast
data can be deleted.
6.6 Case 6
6.6.1 Summary
Figure 6.6 has an insider working for the organization as an IT administrator. Af-
ter being fired, he created another user account. Later he accessed the organization’s
server using the backdoor account from his home and public network. He deleted
some customer data using this account and affected the availability of the company’s
server.
6.6.2 Model Representation
The sequence of actions can be described with the model as:
1. Creation of process P1 by insider using access to the computer V1.
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Figure 6.6: Model Representation of Case 6
2. He accessed the account server at V2 using E1 to create a process P2.
3. He then created an account object at account server using P2.
4. Further, he gained capabilities through the newly created account, after creating
an edge E2 using home computer to V2.
5. Insider used newly gained capabilities to create a new edge E3 from outside the
system to V3
6. Finally he deleted objects o31 to o3n using the delete capabilities.
6.6.3 Mitigation Strategy
1. Threat Action - Creation of new backdoor account with administrator privilege
Countermeasure - The nodes representing Policy Enforcement Points (Point
which manages access authorization policies) should be kept out of the business
application nodes, with additional enabled separation of duty. Such a separation
could be expensive and organizations with limited resources can just do with
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Figure 6.7: Model Representation of Case 7
the separation of duty.
2. Threat Action - Deleted customer data and made it hard for customers to
access data
Countermeasure - New account created by the person had capability to delete
data which is a case of capability creation. Capability creation should be entitled
to Separation of Duty principle.
6.7 Case 7
6.7.1 Summary
Figure 6.7 describes a scenario where insider disabled the anti-virus application in
the organization’s system. Following it, a malware was installed to it which was used
to gain unauthorized access to his supervisor’s system. This access was then used to
plant a logic bomb at a critical server.
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6.7.2 Model Representation
The sequence of actions can be described with the model as:
1. Insider used the access to his computer V1 for creation of process P11.
2. He disabled the anti virus process P12 by killing it using the kill capability
through the edge E1.
3. He created a malware object o1 at V1 as no anti-virus was available to stop this
event.
4. Further, he used an edge E2 through internet from V1 to supervisor’s computer
V2 using access capability gained from the newly created malware.
5. Creation of process P2 by him at supervisor’s computer which was further used
to create an edge E3 from V2 to a critical server V3.
6. Next he created a procedure object o2 at V3 which could act as a logic bomb.
7. o2 could have been executed to create the process P4 at server V3 which would
have affected other objects in the server using write or delete capability.
6.7.3 Mitigation Strategy
1. Threat Action - Disabled anti-virus application to install a malware
Countermeasure - Critical process such as anti-virus should be centrally con-
trolled rather than having the control dispatched to local levels. Systems must
also have certain ”choke-points” (nodes through which data must flow during
system operations) which can provide filtering on malicious codes and software.
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Figure 6.8: Model Representation of Case 8
2. Threat Action - Used malware to gain access to the supervisor system
Countermeasure - Creation of capability should not be allowed by any pro-
cess. Such access rights should be limited to certain highly effective process.
6.8 Case 8
6.8.1 Summary
Figure 6.8 describes a computer system belonging to a large telecommunication
firm where the insider worked as a help desk technician. The insider installed hacking
tools in his computer, stole other employees credential from the server and passed it
to an external conspirator who used this to gain unauthorized access to the website
of the organization and deface it. This led to a loss in customer and share value for
the organization.
6.8.2 Model Representation
The sequence of actions can be described with the model as:
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1. The insider accessed the computer V1 and created the process P1 to install the
hacking tool as an procedure object o1.
2. He used o1 to create a new process P2 at the server V2 which contained other
employee credential using Local Area Network represented by edge E2.
3. He then passed the credential to the external agent physically through edge E3.
4. External agent created an edge E4 to the vertex V3 which contained the website
of the organization.
5. He used the write capabilities gained through the credentials to edit the objects
(o1 to on) stored in the website server.
6.8.3 Mitigation Strategy
1. Threat Action - Help Desk technician installed hacking tools at the company’s
computer
Countermeasure - Trusted system should be highly resistant to manipulation
from within by prohibiting the creation of a new process in the system without
required capabilities.
2. Threat Action - Passed credential to external conspirator
Countermeasure - The access paths to critical nodes such as those containing
credentials should be protected with stronger capabilities. Capabilities should
not be transferable outside the organization. This is not applicable for the
organizations whose systems are controlled by people outside the organizations,
such as contract agencies, in which case such a transfer is inevitable and stronger
access control on external capabilities could facilitate with the security.
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Figure 6.9: Model Representation of Case 9
6.9 Case 9
6.9.1 Summary
Figure 6.9 describes a network engineer working for a retail organization who used
USB VPN tokens for remote access. On being terminated, the insider created a token
in the name of a fake employee, contacted insider IT department to convince them
to activate the token. He further used it to access the network and delete virtual
machines, email servers and storage area network.
6.9.2 Model Representation
The sequence of actions can be described with the model as:
1. The insider created process P1 at his own computer V1 inside the organization.
2. He used P1 to create a VPN token object o1 and passing it to the V2, the server
containing all the tokens.
3. Token was carried outside the organization physically by him through USB,
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represented by edge E2.
4. He then contacted the IT department through edge E3 representing internet
connection, which activated the token object o1 by using the process P4.
5. Further, he used the activated token and its capability to access various servers
to create a new process at servers such as email and SAN server.
6. Finally he used the delete capability to delete the objects in the newly created
processes on the servers.
6.9.3 Mitigation Strategy
1. Threat Action - Created an USB VPN token in name of a fake employee
Countermeasure - Hardware authentication objects should only be forgeable
by the process with strong capabilities.
2. Threat Action - Convinced IT department to activate the token
Countermeasure - Request edges from outside the organization should be
separable from the one within the organization. Since activation of tokens led to
the creation of capabilities, it should involve the Separation of Duty principle.
3. Threat Action - Several months later, VPN used to delete virtual machines,
shutdown SAN and delete email boxes.
Countermeasure - Implementation of procedure to be used for removal of
employees with a high degree of access (e.g. that doesn’t allow them to retain
such privileges after a certain point of time) by implementing the principle of
session-based access control. The killing of a critical process such as the one
running SAN should be bound by strong authentication rules.
45
Figure 6.10: Model Representation of Case 10
6.10 Case 10
6.10.1 Summary
Figure 6.10 describes a system administrator working for a unified messaging ser-
vice discovered a security vulnerability in the organization’s email service. Six months
after leaving the organization, the insider used the organization’s email account to
email 5600 of organization’s customer. The email exposed the security flaw and di-
rected them to a link which crashed the victim organization’s servers and caused a
major damage to reputation.
6.10.2 Model Representation
The sequence of actions can be described with the model as:
1. Creating process P0 at his own computer outside the organization.
2. Using P0 to create a process P1 on the email server inside the organization.
3. Using the email server and write capability to create email objects o1...on and
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send it to various other users.
4. Other users accessing the email object and following the link to access the
resource on the server at V3.
5. Overloading the process P3 at V3 with multiple requests, thus crashing the
server.
6.10.3 Mitigation Strategy
1. Threat Action - After leaving the organization, the old account used to email
employees.
Countermeasure - Account invalidation should cause removal of all the ca-
pabilities associated with the account.
2. Threat Action - Emailed 5600 customers using the organization’s email ac-
count.
Countermeasure - The rate of creation of objects (email in this case) should
be limited and bound by a threshold and a dynamic warning should be gener-
ated when the threshold is exceeded.
6.11 Case 11
6.11.1 Summary
Figure 6.11 describes a situation where a tax preparer for a tax preparation service.
During working hours, the insider printed Personal Identification Information (PII)
of 30 customers. This information was used by the insider to submit fraudulent tax
returns. The refunds of around $290,000 were deposited by the insider at various
bank accounts.
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Figure 6.11: Model Representation of Case 11
6.11.2 Model Representation
The sequence of actions can be described with the model as:
1. Creating process P1 at his own computer V1 inside the organization.
2. Using P1 to create a process P2 on the server containing the PII of the customers.
3. Printing the PII objects o1...on with the ’Read’ capability.
4. Physically accessing the printed objects and moving them to his own space
represented by edge E2.
5. Creating the process P3 to submit fraudulent tax returns using the SSN in the
printed PII objects.
6. Receiving the funds in his own bank accounts.
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6.11.3 Mitigation Strategy
1. Threat Action - Insider printed PII of 30 customers during work hours.
Countermeasure -Actions such as printing should be defined as a ’Copy’
capability and should have more granular access control for critical objects.
2. Threat Action - Submit fraudulent tax records with stolen SSN
Countermeasure - Management of critical objects should be handled with
the principle of Separation of Duty.
6.12 Case 12
6.12.1 Summary
Figure 6.12 describes a scenario where insider planned for the organization and
its customer to loose $1 Million over the course of one year by tempering the risk
assessment’s program’s code. The risks of deal increments were kept very small to
prevent any suspicion so that the traders would not be able to realize the deals getting
riskier with the time.
6.12.2 Model Representation
The sequence of actions can be described with the model as:
1. Creating process P1 at his own computer while working inside the organization.
2. Creating process P2 at the server containing the risk assessment program.
3. Manipulating the risk management program O21 using ’write’ capability.
4. Using an edge E2 at V2, to create the process P3 to run the edited procedure
object.
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Figure 6.12: Model Representation of Case 12
5. Accessing of process P3 running the riskier deal program by various trader’s
processes (P31...P3n) at their respective vertices using the execute capability.
6.12.3 Mitigation Strategy
1. Threat Action - Insertion of logic bomb in the risk assessment program.
Countermeasure - Configured audit log to capture the changes made in crit-
ical procedures which are accessed by high-risk users. This separate log objects
should be monitored frequently.
6.13 Case 13
6.13.1 Summary
Figure 6.13 describes an insider working as a lead software engineer for a govern-
ment agency, who on learning about his future demotion and reduction in pay, wrote
code in an obscure way to undermine the project’s transition. The insider copied the
source code to a removable media and encrypted it with a password. He also deleted
the source code from his laptop and it later turned out to be the only copy of the
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Figure 6.13: Model Representation of Case 13
source code for the system.
6.13.2 Model Representation
The sequence of actions can be described with the model as:
1. The insider accessed the code in procedure object o1 on his computer V1 inside
the organization using the process P1.
2. He used the ′write′ capability to write obscure code in the procedure, rendering
it unreadable.
3. Moreover, he used removable media to copy the code objects from the computer
to the device.
4. He then used the edge E1 to move the physical media from V1 to the external
world.
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5. Lastly he deleted the only copy of source code object from the node V1.
6.13.3 Mitigation Strategy
1. Threat Action - Wrote critical source code in an obscure way
Countermeasure - write capability for critical objects should be reviewed
before making its way towards production. Even for a very small organization
with limited work-force, such capabilities should involve more than one process.
2. Threat Action - Use of removable media to transfer code to the external world
Countermeasure - External devices can provide channels with the unlimited
rate for data extrusion. Such channels, if allowed, should have a capacity limit
and all such transfer should require extra capability.
3. Threat Action - Deleted the only copy of the source code
Countermeasure - Objects of type procedures should have more than just
local copy and should be submitted to a server to maintain software baselines.
6.14 Case 14
6.14.1 Summary
Figure 6.14 describes a software developer and tester as an insider who was ter-
minated for poor performance but the victim organization failed to change a shared
account password upon his departure. The company’s laptop provided by his subse-
quent employer was used by him to remotely access 14 of the victim organization’s
user accounts. The insider also exploited 13 systems storing trade secrets valued at
approximately $1.3 million.
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Figure 6.14: Model Representation of Case 14
6.14.2 Model Representation
The sequence of actions can be described with the model as:
1. The insider accessed his own computer at V1 to learn the shared password which
provided him the capability to access the computer system remotely.
2. He physically moved this capability to the external organization’s system using
the edge E1.
3. The credential of another employee along with the shared password capability
was used by him to access user account server at V2.
4. Further, he accessed accessing 13 other systems containing trade secrets (V31...V3n).
6.14.3 Mitigation Strategy
1. Threat Action - Use of shared password for shared accounts.
Countermeasure - Separate capabilities should be used for access to the
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shared accounts. Such separation can help ease of removal of capabilities when
a process is removed.
2. Threat Action - An access from the external world was able to exploit 13
systems.
Countermeasure -
• A limit should be established on a number of processes that could be
created from a single access.
• Channels from the external world should have restricted capabilities and
access through such channels should always be monitored.
6.15 Limitations
The ability to predict the above attacks and their damage value based on the
model and the algorithms have inherent limitations. For some of the above cases, it
is difficult to foresee the attacks through the model as attackers keep coming up with
unique attack approaches and such approaches could be beyond the scope of policy
framers. Consider the examples in Case 2 and Case 12. Here, the attackers in both
the cases tried to modify procedures to change the behavior of the process which led
to revenue losses to the organizations. Although the model is capable of representing
such attack after it has taken place, it is difficult to anticipate such attacks and
calculate the damage in advance. Similarly, Case 3 represents a scenario of physical
manipulation of objects and it is tough to calculate the extent of such manipulation
beforehand. Hence, our algorithm for data leakage cannot take into account such
leakage as the capacity of physical channels can be unpredictable.
In cases where social factors are used to devise attacks, there are limited means to
model such events. Such as in Case 9, where convincing the IT department to activate
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the token can be seen as an attack involving social engineering. Likewise, the extent
of external help is also difficult to be determined, and hence could not be modeled
perfectly before the attack occurs. Case 10 is an example of such a scenario where the
insider used the vulnerability of the organization’s customers to attack the services.
While cases like these do arise, but from our study of several attacks, we found that
such method of attacks are rare. But such parameters should be considered while
developing the policies and appropriate methods should be engineered to prevent
them.
55
Chapter 7
CONCLUSION
As organizations continuously face threats from users of their computer system, dif-
ferent models have been introduced to represent these threats and predict the risk
value of a user. In this thesis, we take these approaches further by looking at the
problem from a perspective of capabilities that the users possess, and how the calcu-
lation of the potential threat of that user depends on dynamic augmentation of these
capabilities. Although we focus on two major aspects of damage, i.e. information
flow and leakage, and change in the availability of the system, yet we believe that the
model serves a more general purpose for almost every kind of damage that a user can
cause to the computer system.
We implement the model to show that it can be used in real-world scenarios. We
also analyze several insider attacks that took place in the last few decades to suggest
how our model could represent those attacks and then suggest mitigation strategies
within the scope of our model for all such use cases.
There are several areas in which the model can be improved in the future.
• The current model represents the physical users as a process with pre-defined
capabilities. But the physical capabilities of a user can be dependent on many
other features of the external environment and would need more detailed rep-
resentation.
• The thesis focuses on the damage potential of a user of the system based on
just their individual capabilities. However, the user can collude with other
users to complete its attack. Such collusion can dynamically change the damage
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potential of the insider and can be a subject of future research.
• The suggested mitigation approaches for all the use cases are within the scope
of our model. Other mitigation approaches can be suggested keeping other
real-world factors in mind.
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